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JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-

3(2)0).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or
regulations whose interpretation is either determinative or of central importance to the
appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE,
This case concerns the enforcement of a written "Guaranty of Certain Lease

Obligations" (the "Guaranty") pursuant to which Blaine P. Fetter ("Fetter") guaranteed to
pay for "all costs and expenses incurred in connection with the design, construction and
installation of all improvements to the leased premises" for which the Tenant, Pina
Unlimited LLC ("Pina") was obligated to pay to the Landlord, Warehouse Commercial

Fetter includes a "Statement of Related Cases" in his brief even though there is
no reference to the "related case" in the record below. This Court should disregard any
references to the "Related Case" as it is not supported by the record. See Rule 24(a)(7) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure ("all statements of fact and references to the
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record.")
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L.L.C. ("Warehouse") under a Commercial Lease Agreement (the "Lease").2 Pursuant to
the Lease, Pina was required to pay for the costs and installation of a make-up air and
exhaust system ("Exhaust System"), but failed to do so. Accordingly, Fetter, as a
guarantor, is liable for said costs.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
On September 23, 1999, Brailsford filed an Amended Complaint against Fetter,

Christian Oesch ("Oesch"), and Pina for, among other things, breach of the Guaranty.
Brailsford later filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Fetter to enforce
the Guaranty pursuant to the second and third causes of action of Brailsford5 s Amended
Complaint. The trial court granted Brailsford's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
and a judgment was entered against Fetter on April 22, 2003. Subsequently, Brailsford
dismissed all of his claims against Fetter's co-defendants, without prejudice, rendering
the judgment against Fetter final. Fetter now appeals that judgment.
III.

DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT.
On April 22, 2003, the trial court entered an order granting Brailsford's Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment. The trial court entered judgment against Fetter in the amount
of $89,686.63 together with post-judgment interest at the statutory rate. The trial court's
Order was not final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because
2

--

Warehouse assigned its claims against Fetter to Ken Brailsford ("Brailsford").

— -

2

it adjudicated fewer than all the claims of the parties as Fetter was only one of multiple
defendants.
On May 17, 2004, Brailsford and Fetter stipulated that the claims against the other
defendants, Pina and Oesch, neither of whom had been served or entered an appearance,
would be dismissed without prejudice and the Order would become final.
The trial court entered an Order on May 17, 2004 dismissing Pina and Oesch
without prejudice and rendering the Order against Fetter final pursuant to Rule 54 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Fetter filed a Notice of Appeal on or about March 31,
2004 appealing the judgment against him.
IV.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
1.

On or about August 2, 1996, Warehouse, as Landlord, entered into the

Lease with Pina, as Tenant, for property located at 327 West 200 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah (the "leased premises"). (R. at 169, 173-196.)
2.

Pursuant to the Lease, Warehouse was to rent the leased premises to Pina

for a period often (10) years, commencing on January 1, 1997. (R. at 173-196.)
3.

Pina leased the leased premises in order to operate a restaurant. (R. at 169.)

4.

The building in which the leased premises was located was a mixed-use

condominium project which contained condominium units on the upper floors. (R. at
173, 433 p. 4.)
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5.

The main level of the building was to be converted into a restaurant. (R. at

433 p. 4.)
6.

The leased premises was a bare shell that needed to be built out for use as a

restaurant. (R. at 152, 169.) Accordingly, numerous improvements needed to be made to
accommodate a restaurant. (R. at 169.)
7.

Among the necessary improvements to the leased premises was the Exhaust

System. (R. at 169.) The Exhaust System was needed for the kitchen area so that smoke
and fumes could be vented out and fresh air brought back into the kitchen area. (R. 433
p. 5.)
8.

Warehouse was unwilling to bear the costs of purchasing the Exhaust

System without being repaid by Pina and without those costs being guaranteed by Fetter
and Oesch, principals of Pina. (R. at 153, 159, 179-180.)
9.

Pina requested that Warehouse loan the money for the cost of the Exhaust

System to Pina. (R. at 153.)
10.

Warehouse agreed to loan the money to Pina for the Exhaust System and to

be paid back over five years at eight percent interest. (R. at 153.)
11.

Section 12 of the Lease expressly provides that:

12.
CONSTRUCTION OF IMPROVEMENTS TO THE PREMISES.
Landlord agrees prior to the commencement of the lease term, at
Landlord's sole cost and expense, to make the improvements to the leased
premises designated as Landlord's responsibility on the plans and

4

specifications which are attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and herein by this
reference ("Landlord Improvements"). Tenant shall be responsible, and
shall pay the full cost for all other improvements to the premises, as
shown and described on attached Exhibit "B" ("Tenant's
Improvements"). Tenant agrees that no minor changes from said plans
and specifications which may be necessary during the improvement of the
leased premises shall affect, invalidate or otherwise change this Lease. In
the event that Tenant requests any modifications to Landlord's
Improvements which are acceptable to Landlord, Tenant shall pay, in
advance, all construction, architectural and other costs incurred in
connection with such changes on the basis of Landlord's cost to make such
changes plus eight percent (8%). The parties hereto agree that Tenant's
occupancy of the premises shall constitute formal acceptance that the same
are in the condition called for hereunder, except for any items specifically
excepted in writing at date of occupancy as incomplete. Landlord's
Improvements shall be warranted by Landlord's general contractor against
construction defects for a period of one-year following construction.
(R. at 178.)
12.

Exhibit B to the Lease consists of two pages. (R. at 195-196.) The first

page of Exhibit B to the Lease contains the heading "PAID BY LANDLORD" and
specifically provides that:
HVAC equipment and ductwork to main floor and basement for 72 degree
environment; exhaust system for kitchen including make-up air (excluding
hoods), as designed by Tenant and approved by Landlord HVAC engineer
(system to be installed by Tenant, but cost of equipment and
installation financed by Landlord and repaid through rent)
(R. at 195.) (emphasis added).
13.

The second page of Exhibit B to the Lease contains the heading "PAID BY

TENANT" and specifically provides that:
Hoods for appliances; design of makeup air and exhaust system
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(R. at 196.).
14.

Section 14 of the Lease provides in part that:

Tenant's principals, Blaine Fetter and Christian Oesch, shall personally
guaranty the payment of all costs and expenses of Tenant's Improvements
to the premises, in accordance with the Guaranty Agreement which is
attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by this reference.
(R. at 179-180.)
15.

Section 5 of the Lease additionally provides that:

BASE RENT. Tenant covenants and agrees to pay to Landlord, its
representatives, agents, successors and assigns, as minimum rental for the
premises the following amounts (the "Base Rent"):
[Note: These amounts will increase to include amortization of the cost
of the make up air and exhaust system over a 5-year period, with
interest at 8%]
(R. at 175.) (emphasis original).
16.

In connection with the Lease, Fetter and Oesch, signed the Guaranty. (R. at

197-199.)
17.

The Guaranty provides:

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, and in consideration of and inducement for the
execution and delivery of the Lease referred to above between the Landlord and Tenant, the undersigned Guarantors hereby guarantee to Landlord the
full and prompt payment of all costs and expenses incurred in connection
with the design, construction and installation of all improvements to
the leased premises to be paid by Tenant, and the performance of all of
tenants other duties and obligations set forth in Sections 12 and 14 of the
Lease. Guarantors hereby covenant and agree that if Tenant shall at any

fi

time fail to pay or otherwise perform its obligations under Sections 12 or
14, the Guarantors shall promptly pay such amounts, and/or perform and
fulfill all of such terms, covenants, conditions and agreements, and will pay
the Landlord all damages and expenses, including attorney's fees, that may
arise in consequence of any default by the Tenant in the payment of such
sums.
This Guaranty is an absolute and unconditional guaranty of payment and of
performance of the duties and obligations of Tenant under Sections 12 and
14 of the Lease. It shall be enforceable against the Guarantors, or either of
them, without the necessity of any suit or proceedings on the Landlord's
part of any kind or nature whatsoever against the Tenant. The Guarantors
hereby expressly agree that the validity of this Guaranty and the obligations
of the Guarantors hereunder shall in no way be terminated, affected,
diminished or impaired by reason of the assertion or failure to assert by the
Landlord against the Tenant any of the rights and remedies available to the
Landlord, or by relief of Tenant from any of the Tenant's obligations under
the Lease by the rejection of the Lease in connection with the proceedings
under the bankruptcy or insolvency laws now or hereafter in effect or
otherwise.
This Guaranty shall be a continuing guaranty, and the liability of the
Guarantors hereunder shall in no way be affected, modified or diminished
by reason of any assignment, renewal, modification or extension of the
Lease or by reason of any modification or waiver of or change in any of the
terms, covenants, conditions or provisions of the Lease, or by reason of any
dealings or transactions or matters or things occurring between Landlord
and the Tenant, whether or not the Guarantors have knowledge or notice
thereof.

All the Landlord's rights and remedies under the said Lease or under this
Guaranty are intended to be distinct, separate and cumulative, and no such
right and remedy therein or herein mentioned is intended to be an exclusion
or a waiver of any of the others . . . .
(R. 197-199.) (emphasis added).
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18.

Warehouse paid $112,476.70 for the purchase, construction and installation

of the Exhaust System and some other minor HVAC work. (R. at 153.)
19.

Fetter had discussions with Warehouse concerning what portion of the

payments should be attributed to the Exhaust System. (Id.)
20.

Fetter believed that the amount attributable to the Exhaust System was only

$90,000.00. (Id.) Warehouse believed the amount was greater. (R. at 154.)
21.

Warehouse accepted Fetter's designation of $90,000 as the principal

amount to be paid for the Exhaust System. (R. at 154.)
22.

Fetter then provided a loan repayment schedule to Warehouse for the

Exhaust System describing the loan amount as $90,000, the loan date of January 1, 1997,
the term of the loan as 60 months, the interest rate as eight percent, monthly payments of
$1,824.88 per month, and an allocation of each monthly payment to interest and
principal. (R. at 154, 156.) (Attached as Exhibit "A" to the Addendum is a copy of the
loan repayment schedule provided by Fetter).
23.

Pina made separate payments for the rent and the amount due for the

Exhaust System. (R. at 154 - 163; 170.) (Attached as Exhibit B to the Addendum is a
collection of checks, signed by Fetter, that were received from Pina for the Exhaust
System (the "Checks")). The Checks describe payments for the Exhaust System as
amounts for "Tenant Improvement Amortization." (Id.)

R

24.

Pina made amortization payments for the Exhaust System for the period

February 1997 through May, 1998 for a total of 16 payments. (R. at 154.) Pursuant to
Pina's own loan repayment schedule, Pina still owed a principal balance of $69,390.86.
(R. at 154, 156.)
25.

In June 1998, the Pina Restaurant closed for business. (R. at 202.)

26.

At that time, Pina had failed to make monthly rental payments pursuant to

the Lease Agreement. (R. at 202.) See also Addendum at Exhibit "B" to Appellant's
Brief.
27.

Pursuant to Paragraph 26.4 of the Lease, Pina granted to Warehouse a first

priority lien and security interest in all of the trade fixtures, equipment, appliances,
cookware, dishes, utensils and all other personal property located in the space. (R. at
186-187.)
28.

On or about June 12, 1998, Warehouse filed a lawsuit seeking, among other

things, recovery of past due rent and a restraining order enjoining Pina from removing
any of the property subject to the Security Agreement. (R. at 202.) See also addendum
Ex. B. to Appellant's Brief.
29.

Subsequently, Pina stipulated to an order granting a writ of attachment

directing the constable to attach the personal property, equipment and fixtures subject to
the Security Agreement, and allowing the constable to change the locks for the Space, as
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Pina was in breach of the lease. (R. at 202.) See also Addendum Ex. C to Appellant's
Brief.
30.

The leased premises has been leased to another tenant. (R. at 202.)

31.

On or about August 25, 1999, Commercial assigned its claims against Pina

Restaurant and against Fetter under the Guaranty to Brailsford. (R. at 154, 171.)
32.

Fetter did not raise "surrender and acceptance" as an affirmative defense in

his Answer to the Amended Complaint. (R. at 108-115.) (Attached as Exhibit C to the
Addendum is a copy of Fetter's Answer to the Amended Complaint).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In order to operate a restaurant at the leased premises, numerous improvements
needed to be made. Among them was the Exhaust System. Pina requested that
Warehouse loan the money for the costs of the Exhaust System to Pina. However,
Warehouse was unwilling to bear the costs of the Exhaust System without being repaid
by Pina and without those costs being guaranteed by Fetter and Oesch, Pina's principals.
Accordingly, Warehouse financed the costs of the Exhaust System, but was to be repaid
by Pina, pursuant to the Lease, over a five-year period at eight percent interest.
Additionally, Fetter personally guaranteed payment of "all costs and expenses incurred in
connection with the design, construction and installation of all improvements to the
leased premises to be paid by Tenant. . . ." Inasmuch as Pina was required to pay for the

m

Exhaust System (which Fetter acknowledges is an improvement) pursuant to the Lease,
Fetter, as a guarantor, is liable for said costs.
Fetter's argument that the Guaranty was terminated by the surrender and
acceptance of the premises is without merit because (1) Fetter waived the affirmative
defense of surrender and acceptance by not asserting it in his Answer to the Amended
Complaint; (2) the doctrine of surrender and acceptance is not applicable in this case; (3)
surrender and acceptance only discharges future rent obligations, not liabilities which
were incurred prior to termination of a lease; and (4) even if the Lease was terminated,
the Guaranty was absolute and unconditional.
Finally, Fetter's argument that he is entitled to an offset is without merit because
(1) he failed to raise the argument in the trial court; (2) he did not obtain written consent
for any improvements as required by the Lease; and (3) a tenant is not entitled to be
reimbursed for improvements it makes absent an agreement to the contrary.
Pursuant to the express language of the Guaranty, Fetter is liable for the costs of
the Exhaust System. The judgment against Fetter should be affirmed and Brailsord
should be entitled to additional attorney's fees incurred on appeal.
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ARGUMENT
I.

FETTER GUARANTEED THE PAYMENT OF THE EXHAUST SYSTEM.
Fetter guaranteed Pina's obligation to pay for the Exhaust System. The Guaranty

expressly provides that:
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, and in consideration of and as an inducement
for the execution and delivery of the Lease referred to above between
Landlord and Tenant, the undersigned Guarantors hereby guarantee to
Landlord the full and prompt payment of all costs and expenses incurred in
connection with the design, construction and installation of all
improvements to the leased premises to be paid by Tenant, and the
performance of all of Tenant's other duties and obligations set forth in
Sections 12 and 14 of the Lease.
(R. 198.) (emphasis added).
In other words, Fetter not only personally guaranteed payment for all the Tenant
Improvements provided for in Sections 12 and 14 of the Lease, but also any costs and
expenses for other improvements which were to be paid by Pina under the Lease. Fetter
acknowledges that the Exhaust System is an improvement. {See Fetter's Statement of
Facts at If 5.) Accordingly, the only question to be determined is whether Pina was
obligated to pay for the cost and installation of the Exhaust System under the Lease.
As set forth more fully below, Pina was unequivocally required to pay for the
Exhaust System under the Lease. Inasmuch as Pina failed to pay for the costs of the
Exhaust System, Fetter, as a guarantor, is obligated to do so.

12

A-

Pina Was Obligated To Pay For The Cost And Installation Of The
Exhaust System Pursuant To Sections 12 And 14 Of The Lease.

Pina was required to pay for the Exhaust System under both Sections 12 and 14 of
the Lease. Section 12 of the Lease specifically provides that:
12. CONSTRUCTION OF IMPROVEMENTS TO THE PREMISES.
Landlord agrees prior to the commencement of the lease term, at
Landlord's sole cost and expense, to make the improvements to the leased
premises designated as Landlord's responsibility on the plans and
specifications which are attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and herein by this
reference ("Landlord's Improvements"). Tenant shall be responsible, and
shall pay the full cost for all other improvements to the premises, as
shown and described on attached Exhibit "B" ("Tenant's Improvements").
(R. at 178.) (emphasis added).
Exhibit B to the Lease consists of two pages. The first page of Exhibit B
contains the heading "PAID BY LANDLORD" and specifically provides that:
HVAC equipment and ductwork on main floor and basement
for 72 degree environment; exhaust system for kitchen including
make-up air (excluding hoods), as designed by Tenant and
approved by Landlord HVAC engineer (system to be installed
by Tenant, but cost of equipment and installation financed by
Landlord and repaid through rent.)
(R. at 195.) (emphasis added).3
Section 14.3 of the Lease further provides that:
Tenant's principals, Blaine Fetter and Christian Oesch, shall
personally guaranty the payment of all costs and expenses of Tenant's
Improvements to the premises, in accordance with the Guaranty Agreement
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by this
reference.
(continued...)
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Although the cost of the Exhaust System is under the heading "PAID BY
LANDLORD," rather than the heading "PAID BY TENANT" it is clearly a Tenant
Improvement and an obligation which ultimately was to be paid for by Pina. Section 12
of the Lease defines "Tenant Improvements" as those improvements which are not the
Landlord's responsibility under Exhibit B. Because Exhibit B expressly provides that the
Landlord was to merely finance the cost of the Exhaust System and that the Tenant was
to repay those costs, they were "Tenant Improvements" rather than "Landlord
Improvements."
Fetter himself has characterized the Exhaust System as a Tenant Improvement. In
fact, Fetter signed separate checks to repay the cost of the Exhaust System, which
described said payments as "Tenant Improvements." Nothing shows the intention of the
parties more clearly than the interpretation they themselves place upon a contract.
Trucker Sales Corp. v. Potter, 104 Utah 1, 137 P.2d 370, 371 (1943). It is well settled
that where the parties to a contract, by their actions, place upon it a construction which is
not contrary to the usual meaning of the language used, courts will follow that
construction. Id. (citing Powers v. Lawson, 56 Utah 420, 191 P.227 (1920); Roberts v.
Puttie, 36 Utah 614, 105 P. 916 (1909); Titton v. Sterling Coal & Coke Co., 28 Utah 173,
(...continued)

14

77 P. 758 (1904); Snyder v. Fidelity Savings Association, 23 Utah 291, 64 P. 870 (1901);
Woodward v. Edmonds, 20 Utah 118,57 P. 848 (1899); Peay v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah
331, 40 P. 206 (1895)). As demonstrated by Fetter's own actions, the Exhaust System
was a Tenant Improvement to be paid for by Pina under Sections 12 and 14 of the Lease.
Therefore, Fetter is liable to repay said costs under the Guaranty.
Fetter argues that Pina had no obligation to pay for the costs and installation of the
Exhaust System under Sections 12 and 14 because the list of items "TO BE PAID BY
TENANT" on Exhibit B only identifies the design of the Exhaust System. Fetter further
claims, at the very least, that Exhibit B is ambiguous.4 Fetter's argument is without
merit. Pursuant to basic principles of contract interpretation, neither the Lease nor the
Guaranty is ambiguous.
In interpreting a contract, courts first look to the four corners of the agreement to
determine the intent of the parties. Cherry v. Utah State Univ. 966 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah
App. 1998). It is axiomatic that a contract should be interpreted so as to harmonize all of
its provisions and all of its terms, and that all of its terms should be given effect. Buehner
Block Co. v. UWC Associates, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988); Utah Valley Bank v.

Fetter incorrectly asserts that because the Lease is allegedly ambiguous, it
should be construed against the drafter, who Fetter infers is Warehouse. However, there
is no support in the record for the assertion that Warehouse drafted either the Lease or the
Guaranty. Therefore, the argument must be rejected.
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Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Utah 1981); WebBankv. American General Annuity
Service Corp., 54 P.3d 1139, 1144 (Utah 2002) (in interpreting contract, court looks to
writing itself to ascertain parties' intentions, and considers each contract provision in
relation to all others, with view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none). A contract
provision is not necessarily ambiguous because parties differ in their interpretation of its
language. WillardPease Oil and Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil and Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 772
(Utah 1995). To demonstrate an ambiguity in a contract provision, the contrary positions
must each be a reasonable interpretation of the terms of the provision. Id.
Here, the only reasonable interpretation of the Lease and the Guaranty is that
Fetter is obligated to pay for the cost and installation of the Exhaust System because Pina
was obligated to pay for it. Any other interpretation would be contrary to the intent of the
parties.
Fetter's argument ignores these principles of contract interpretation and overlooks
key contractual provisions. First, Fetter ignores Section 12 of the Lease which provides
that "Tenant shall be responsible, and shall pay the full cost for all other improvements to
the premises, as shown and described on attached Exhibit "B." Second, Fetter ignores
Exhibit "B" to the Lease, which provides that "exhaust system for kitchen including
make-up air (excluding hoods), as designed by Tenant (system to be installed by Tenant,
but cost of equipment and installation financed by Landlord and repaid through
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rent)." Finally, Fetter ignores Section 5 of the Lease which states that "Note: These
amounts will increase to include amortization of the cost of the make up air and exhaust
system over a 5-year period, with interest at 8%."
When read together, these contractual provisions demonstrate the intent of the
parties that Warehouse was to finance the initial costs and installation of the Exhaust
System, that Pina was to repay those costs, and that Fetter was to guarantee them. It was
never the intent of the parties to burden the Landlord with the costs of the Exhaust
System. Fetter's interpretation is contrary to the intent of the parties. In short, Fetter is
liable for the cost of the Exhaust System because it was a Tenant Improvement cost to be
paid by Pina under the Lease and Fetter personally guaranteed Pina's obligation to pay
for it.
B.

Pina Was Also Obligated To Pay For The Exhaust System Pursuant To
Section 5 Of The Lease.

Even if the Exhaust System was not a "Tenant Improvement," Pina nevertheless
agreed to pay for the costs of the Exhaust System under Section 5 of the Lease. Section 5
of the Lease specifically provides that:
Base Rent. Tenant covenants and agrees to pay to Landlord, its
representatives, agents, successors and assigns, as minimum rental for the
premises the following amounts (the "Base Rent"):
[Note: These amounts will increase to include amortization of the cost
of the makeup air and exhaust system over a 5-year period, with
interest at 8%] (emphasis original).

UT_DOCS_A #1157024 v1
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Although the amortized costs of the Exhaust System were to be repaid with rent, they did
not constitute renl. Rather, the rental amount was simply increased by the amortization
of the costs of the Exhaust System for five years even though the lease itself was for ten
years.
Additionally, both Fetter and Pina characterized the obligation as a "Loan" rather
than rent by preparing an amortization schedule, and by making out separate checks for
the rent and the repayment of the amortized costs of the Exhaust System. Trucker Sales
Corp. v. Potter, 104 Utah 1, 137 P.2d 370, 371 (1943). Thus, the trial court properly
construed the obligation as the repayment of a loan, rather than rent.
Fetter argues that he did not guarantee Pina's obligation to pay for the Exhaust
System because there is nothing in the Guaranty which specifically references Section 5
of the Lease or Pina's obligation to pay rent. In making this argument, Fetter ignores the
plain language of his Guaranty: "Guarantors hereby guarantee to Landlord the full and
prompt payment of all costs and expenses incurred in connection with . . . the
construction and installation of all improvements to the leased premises to be paid
by Tenant." (emphasis added). Here, there is no question that the Exhaust System is an
improvement to the leased premises. The fact that Pina was expressly obligated to repay
the Landlord the costs of the Exhaust System whether by direct payment, or along with

the rents, should end the inquiry because Fetter guaranteed to pay for the costs of all
improvements to be paid by Pina.
II.

THE GUARANTY WAS NOT TERMINATED BY THE ALLEGED
SURRENDER AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE LEASED PREMISES.
Fetter claims that because the Lease was allegedly terminated under the doctrine

of "surrender and acceptance," both Pina's obligation to pay for the costs of the Exhaust
System and Fetter's Guaranty were terminated. Fetter's argument lacks merit for several
reasons.
A.

Fetter Has Waived The Affirmative Defense of "Surrender and
Acceptance."

Fetter's argument that the premises was "surrendered and accepted" has been
waived. Surrender and acceptance is an affirmative defense. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha
Ins, Co,, 776 P.2d 896, 901 (Utah 1989). Failure to plead an affirmative defense
constitutes a waiver of the defense pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h). Valley Bank and
Trust Co, v. Wilken, 668 P.2d 493, 493 (Utah 1983). Fetter failed to plead "surrender and
acceptance" as an affirmative defense in his Answer to the Amended Complaint.
(R. 108-115.) Accordingly, it has been waived.
B.

The Doctrine Of Surrender And Acceptance Is Inapplicable.

Even if the Court finds no waiver, the doctrine of surrender and acceptance is
inapplicable in this case. First, Brailsford is not attempting to recover rents. Rather, he is
attempting to recover payments for improvements which were financed by the Landlord
UT_DOCS_A #1157024 v1
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and which were to be repaid by the Tenant. Said repayments do not constitute rent and
were simply repayments of a loan. Even Fetter has characterized the payments as an
amortization of a loan rather than payment of rent.
Second, the Lease has never been terminated. Section 26.3 of the Lease provides
in part that:
. . . No such re-entry or retaking possession of the premises by Landlord
shall be construed as an election on its part to terminate this Lease unless a
written notice of such intention is given to Tenant or unless the termination
thereof is decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Even though a court entered an order granting a writ of attachment, it never ruled that the
Lease was terminated. Nor did the Landlord give any written notice of its intent to
terminate the Lease. In fact, the very purpose of the action was premised on Pina's
breach of the Lease for ceasing to make the monthly rental payments. Therefore, the
Lease was not terminated.5

5

Fetter cites Reid v. Mutual Of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 900 (Utah
1989) in support of his argument that the Lease was allegedly terminated by surrender
and acceptance. In Reid, the tenant gave notice and voluntarily vacated the premises. Id.
at 890. The Landlord subsequently remodeled the premises and leased it to another
tenant. Id. Even under those circumstances, the Reid court held that the Landlord's
actions did not amount to a termination of the lease by reason of surrender and
acceptance.
Here, unlike the tenant in Reid, Pina never voluntarily surrendered the leased
premises. Instead, a court entered an order granting a writ of attachment and allowing the
constable to change the locks due to Pina's breach of the Lease. Therefore, Pina never
(continued...)
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Third, the doctrine of surrender and acceptance does not apply because the Tenant
is liable for rents even after termination of the Lease. Section 26.3 of the Lease provides
that:
. . . Should Landlord at any time terminate this Lease for any breach, in
addition to any other remedies Landlord may have, Landlord may recover
from Tenant all damages it may incur by reason of such breach, including .
. . the present value (calculated using a 6% interest factor) at the time of
such termination of the excess, if any, of the amount of rent and charges
equivalent to rent reserved in this Lease for the remainder of the lease term
over the then reasonable rental value of the premises for the remainder of
the lease term, all of which amounts shall be immediately due and payable
from Tenant to Landlord
Thus, even if the Lease were terminated, the Tenant was nevertheless obligated to pay
rent.
Finally, termination of a lease by reason of surrender and acceptance only operates
to discharge the lessee from future obligations to pay rent. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha,
776 P.2d 896, 900 (Utah 1989); Petersen v. Hodges, 121 Utah 72, 239 P.2d 180, 182
(1951). It does not relieve the lessee of liability incurred prior to the surrender.
Nicholas A. Cutaia, Inc. v. Buyer's Bazaar, Inc., 637 N.Y.S.2d 857 (N.Y. App. 1996); 49
Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 261 (2004) (the surrender of a lease by a tenant, even
though made with the consent of or by agreement with the landlord, operates only to
(...continued)

voluntarily surrendered the premises and the doctrine of surrender and acceptance cannot
apply.
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release him from liability on the covenants taking effect after the date of the surrender).
In this case, Pina's obligation to pay for the cost and installation of the Exhaust System
was incurred prior to any alleged termination of the Lease. Moreover, due to Pina's
breach, all rents were accelerated and were due prior to any alleged termination of the
Lease. Therefore, even if the Lease was terminated by the doctrine of "surrender and
acceptance," Fetter remains liable.
C.

The Guaranty Was Unconditional.

Even if the Lease were terminated by the doctrine of "surrender and acceptance,"
the Guaranty was meant to be enforceable after the Lease had been breached or
terminated. Indeed, that was the very purpose of the Guaranty. Under Utah law, a
guarantee of the payment of an obligation without words of limitation or condition, is
construed as an absolute and unconditional guaranty. Valley Bank and Trust Co. v Rite
Way Concrete Farming, Inc., 742 P.2d 105, 100 (Utah App. 1987); Strevell-Patterson
Co. Inc. v. Francis, 646 P.2d 741, 743 (Utah 1982); North Park Bank of Commerce v.
Bottom, Utah 645 P.2d 620 (Utah 1982).
The Guarantee did not provide any words of limitation or condition. Rather, the
Guaranty confirmed that it is absolute and unconditional and meant to survive
termination of the Lease. The Guaranty specifically provides that:
This Guaranty is an absolute and unconditional guaranty
of payment and of performance of the duties and obligations of

72

Tenant under Sections 12 and 14 of the Lease. It shall be
enforceable against the Guarantors, or either of them, without the
necessity of any suit or proceedings on the Landlord's part of any
kind or nature whatsoever against the Tenant. The Guarantors
hereby expressly agree that the validity of this Guaranty and the
obligations of the Guarantors hereunder shall in no way be
terminated, affected, diminished or impaired by reason of the
assertion or failure to assert by the Landlord against the Tenant
any of the rights and remedies available to the Landlord, or by
relief of Tenant from any of Tenant's obligations under the
Lease by rejection of the Lease in connection with the
proceedings under the bankruptcy or insolvency laws now or
hereafter in effect or otherwise.
This Guaranty shall be a continuing guaranty, and the liability
of the Guarantors hereunder shall in no way be affected, modified or
diminished by reason of any assignment, renewal, modification or
extension of the Lease or by reason of any modification or waiver of
or change in any of the terms, covenants, conditions or provisions of
the Lease, or by reason of any extensions of time that may be
granted by the Landlord to the Tenant or by reason of a change for
different use of the demised premises or by reason of any dealings or
transactions or matters or things occurring between Landlord and the
Tenant, whether or not the Guarantors have knowledge or notice
thereof....
AH the Landlord's rights and remedies under the said
Lease or under this Guaranty are intended to be distinct,
separate and cumulative, and no such right and remedy therein
or herein mentioned is intended to be an exclusion or a waiver of
any of the others . . . .
(R. at 197-199.) (emphasis added). Therefore, even if the Lease was terminated by
"surrender and acceptance", Fetter is nevertheless liable under the Guaranty for the cost
and installation of the Exhaust System.
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D.

Recovery Under The Guaranty Does Not Amount To A Double
Recovery,

Finally, allowing the Landlord to keep the Exhaust System and to recover
additional amounts would not amount to an impermissible double recovery. It is
generally recognized that absent a specific lease term to the contrary, fixtures placed on a
premises by a tenant remain with the leased premises after eviction. See generally, State
v. Attrnan/GlazerP.B. Co., 594 A.2d 138, 146 (Md. 1990) ("the [trial] court concluded
that it would be unfair for [landlord] to realize the value of these improvements as part of
the condemnation award when the improvements were paid for by the [tenant]. In so
concluding, the court ignored the plain language of the lease and violated well-settled
contract law.").
Pina was specifically required to both pay for and surrender the improvements
upon termination of the Lease. Section 20 of the Lease provides that:
SURRENDER OF PREMISES: At the termination of the tenancy
hereby created, Tenant shall deliver to Landlord the leased premises
in the same condition as the leased premises were in upon delivery
of possession thereof to Tenant. . . Tenant's obligations to observe
or perform this covenant shall survive expiration or other
termination of the term of this Lease.
Accordingly, the fact that the Exhaust System was left on the premises and is presumably
now being used by a new restaurant tenant is of no legal significance to the question of
whether Pina should have paid for it. Pina was obligated to pay for the Exhaust System
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whether it remained in the leased premises for the full ten years or not. And, Fetter
unconditionally guaranteed to pay for the Exhaust System if Pina failed to do so.
The cases cited by Fetter are easily distinguishable. In each of the cases cited by
Fetter, the Landlord tried to recover damages for improvements made to the premises
after the Lease was terminated. The Landlord claimed that such costs were necessary to
relet the premises. In this instance, Pina was required to pay for the improvements from
the outset. Accordingly, Fetter's argument must be rejected.
III.

FETTER IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN OFFSET.
Fetter is not entitled to an offset as a matter of law. Fetter failed to argue that he

was entitled to an offset in the trial court. It is well settled that appellate courts generally
will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal. In re Schwenke, 89 P.3d
117, 125 (Utah 2004); The View Condominium Owners Association v. MSICO, L.L.C., 90
P.3d 1042, 1052 (Utah App. 2004). Fetter failed to argue in the trial court that he was
entitled to an offset for "additional tenant improvements" which Fetter allegedly incurred
in excess of those agreed to under the Lease. Accordingly, this Court should decline
Fetter's invitation to consider this argument.
In any event, Fetter is not entitled to an offset. Section 12 of the Lease specifically
provides that:
The parties hereto agree that Tenant's occupancy of the
premises shall constitute formal acceptance that the same are in the
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condition called for hereunder, except for any items specifically
excepted in writing at date of occupancy as incomplete.
Section 14 of the Lease further provides that:
Landlord's Consent Required. Tenant shall not make or
cause to be made any alterations, additions, or improvements to the
leased premises, on install or cause to be installed any exterior signs,
antennas, exterior lighting, plumbing fixtures, shades, canopies, or
awnings or make any changes to the exterior of the premises without
the prior written approval of Landlord. Tenant may make interior
non-structural alterations and/or improvements to the leased
premises with the prior written consent of Landlord, which consent
shall not be unreasonably withheld.
Therefore, by occupying the leased premises, Pina formally accepted the Landlord's
improvements. Moreover, if any additional improvements were to be made, the
Landlord's consent was required. There is no evidence in the record that Pina or Fetter
ever received the Landlord's consent for any "additional Tenant Improvements" in excess
of those agreed under the Lease.
Moreover, Courts have routinely held that a tenant is not entitled to compensation
for improvements made to a leasehold in the absence of an agreement that the Landlord
would pay for them, even though the tenant does not have the right to remove the
improvements. In re Estate ofVangen, 370 N.W. 2d 479, 480 (Minn. App. 1985); Lafary
v. Lafary, 522 N.E. Id 916, 918 (Ind. App. 1988); 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant §
902 (2004).

?fi

In the case at bar, there is no agreement requiring the Landlord to pay for any
tenant improvements which Fetter or Pina allegedly incurred in excess of those agreed to
under the Lease. Accordingly, Fetter cannot claim an offset for these alleged
improvements as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Brailsford respectfully requests that the Court affirm
the District Court's Order granting Partial Summary Judgment to Brailsford and to allow
the trail court to augment the judgment for additional interest and attorney's fees incurred
by reason of this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of July 2004.
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP

Ja?on D. JBoren, Esq.
Attorneys for Ken Brailsford
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 30^th day of July 2004,1 caused two true and correct
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to be mailed, via First-Class Mail,
postage prepaid, to the following:
Donald J. Winder, Esq.
John W. Holt, Esq.
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.

175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
P.O. Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
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ADDENDUM

Tab A

on 26,

1997

INA UNLIMITED LLC
V
Loan D a t e :
•Annual I n t e r e s t R a t e :
I n t e r e s t Compounded:

Loan A m o u n t : $ 9 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
Term o f L o a n : 6 0
A m o r t i z a t i o n M e t h o d : N o r m a l , 3 6 0 D/Y
.>MT Due D a t e

1*02-01-97
2-03-01-97
3-04-01-97
4*05-01-97
^.06-01-97
6 07-01-97
7 08-01-97
8 09-01-97
9 10-01-97
10 11-01-97
11 12-01-97
97 totals
2 01 - 0 1 - 9 8
02 • 0 1 - 9 8
A* 03 • 0 1 - 9 8
15 04 - 0 1 - 9 8
16 05 - 0 1 - 9 8
17 06 - 0 1 - 9 8
18 07 • 0 1 - 9 8
19 08 - 0 1 - 9 8
20 09 - 0 1 - 9 8
21 10 - 0 1 - 9 8
22 11 - 0 1 - 9 8
23 12 - 0 1 - 9 8
9>o t o t a l s

Payment

Amount

1,824.88
1,824.88
1,824.88
1,824.88
1,824.88
1,824.88
1,824.88
1,824.88
1,824.88
1,824.88
1,824.88
20,073.68
1,824.88
1,824.88
1,824.88
1,824.88
1,824.88
1,824.88
1,824.88
1,824.88
1,824.88
1,824.88
1,824.88
1,824.88
21,898.56

Interest

600.00
591.83
583.61
575.34
567.01
558.62
550.18
541.68
533.13
524.52
5,15. 85
6,141.77
507.12
498.34
489.49
480.59
471.63
462.61
453.52
444 .38
435.18
425.91
416.59
407.20
5,492.56

Principal

1,224.88
1,233.05
1,241.27
1,249.54
1,257.87
1,266.26
1,274.701,283.20
1,291.75
1,300.36
1,309.03

01-01-1997
8.000 %
Monthly
Balance

88,775.12
87,542.07
86,300.80
85,051.26
83,793.39
82,527.13
81,252.43
79,969.23
78,677.48
77,377.12
76,068.09

13,931.91
1,317.76
1,326.54
1,335.39
1,344.29
1,353.25
1,362.27
1,371.36
1,380.50
1,389.70
1,398.97
1,408.29
1,417.68
16,406.00

74,750.33
73,423.79
72,088.40
70,744.11
69,390.86
68,028.59
66,657.23
65,276.73
63,887.03
62,488.06
61,079.77
59,662.09

TabB

RNAUNUMITCD.LLC

215351

327 WEST 200 SOUTH
SALTLAKE CHY, UTAH 84101
(601)355-7462

>AY

Ni

^ ^

90-3752/1211

»>«

Wine Thousand One Hundred Twentv-Etaur and 40/100-

3062

June 26, 1997

:DOUA*S

$9f124.40

TOTHt
OROUOF

r
Haxefaouse T2£

"•00003062W i : i 2 i i a ? 5 2 2 i :

B^l-Olf1!?-1!*

INSCRIPTION

AMOUNT

Amortized tenant inprovenents
February, March, April, May and June § $1,824.88/month

PINA UNLIMITED. LLC SaH Lake Oty, Utah 84101
PIEASE DETACH AND RETAIN THIS STATEMENT • ATTACHED CHECK IS I N PAYMENT OF ITEMS DESCRIBED ABOVE.

M

|1 >

#

PINA UNUMITED, LLC

N?

21535 Mwrthomo Blvd.
Torrance. CA 90503

327 WEST 200 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
(801)355-7462

90-3752/1211

August 1 . 1997

One niousaod Eight Hundred Twenty-Potxc and 88/100-

r

I

3149

-DOUARS

$1,624.86

1
Waretvouse LLC

S^/HOp-HEGtOTIABLE
AUTHORIZED StCNATUKf

»»0G00 3HvrM8 i : i 2 i i 3 ? 5 2 2i: aq?i"=Qi: ; q ?«<?»•
DESCRIPTION

AMOUNT

August TI Aiiurtization

PINA UNLIMITED, LLC Salt Uke City, Utah 84101
PLEASE DETACH AND RETAIN THIS STATEMENT • ATTACHED CHECK IS IN PAYMENT OE ITEMS DESCRIBED ABOVE.

PINA UNLIMITED, LLC

#

Ni'

21536 Hawthorne Blvd.
Tofrance.CA 90503

327 WEST 200 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CfTYt UTAH 84101
(801)355-7462

90-3752/1211

CMif

pAY

3218

September 1 # 1997

cxm TuoosArtp snarr auttt^BD Tuar*ry-roi)R AKD 88/100-

rbouAi*

$i*24.M

TOTHf
ORDER O f

n

r
Uareiiouse WC

NON-NEGOHABLE
</

AUTHOKIZtO SGNMlHtt

tt»OD0D3?ifi.-»

i : i 2 t i a V 5 22i:

BIVKUHI?*'!*1

DESCRIPTION

SeptoaDar tenant iinprovanont amortization

PINA UNLIMITED. LLC

Salt lake City. Utah 84101

PLEASE DETACH A N D RETAIN THIS STATEMENT • A T T A r H m PHFrif rc INf PAVJUFMT r>r I T C U C nix/~f>incn i o n u t

w

PINA UNLIMITED, LLC

N2

21535 Hawthorne Btai
Tocranca.CA 90503

327 WEST 200 SOUTH
SALT IAKE CITY. UTAH 84101
(801)355-7462

90-3752/1211

3290

10/3/97
DATE

1
I

„AW

One thousand eight hundred twenty four and 88/100* * * * * * * *

PAY

c

1,824.88

DOLLARS 5

n

r
COfflfERCIAL WAREHOUSE LLC

c/o. Harrison Horn
2696 No University Ave*, Ste« 290
Provo, UT 84604

.NON4IEGQTIABLE
AUTHOW7ED SHXATUKf

••ocaasjjqo*" i:;ai;3V52ai:

rnvKnifq?"1^

DESCRIPTION

10/3/97

T«I. Amortization

AMOUNT

$1,824,88

PINA UNLIMfTED, LLC Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
PLEASE DETACH AND RETAIN THIS STATEMENT • ATTACHED CHECK IS !N PAYMENT OF ITEMS DESCRIBED ABOVE.

PINA UNLIMITED, LLC
\ *

*

N*

21535 Hawthorne Blvd.
Tofranca, CA 90503

327 WEST 200 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH ©4101

90*3752/1211

(801)355-7462

DATE

One
OAW
PAY
TO THE
ORDER OF

r

#

i

3362

/jf/3/97

<pl,824,88

thousand eight hundred twenty four and 88/100* * * * * * *
-

DOUARS

COMMERCIAL WAREHOUSE LLC
c/o Harriuoa Uorn
2696 N. University Ave., Ste. 290
i>rovof UT 84604

. MO^NIEQbflABLE

e"OGQ033t2;' i : i H i l 3 ? 5 22«: a « m » G i 21 ?««*«•
DESCRIPTION

11/3/97

T.I. Amortization

AMOUNT

$1,824.88

PINA UNLIMITED. LLC Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
?

^^^^^^RJ^I^}!!!lHtS

STATEMENT • ATTACHED CHECK IS I N PAYMENT OF ITEMS DESCRIBED ABOVE,

PINA UNUMITED, LLC
>

Iti

21536 Hawthorne Blvd.
Torrance. CA 90503

327 WEST 200 SOOTH
SALT LAKE CfTYt UTAH 84101
(801)355-7462

90-3752/1211
DATE

PAY \

0aa

cboil

1M7

December 3 . 1997

^ d n d e i g h t huudred twenty four and 8 8 / 1 0 0 * * * * * * *

DOLLARS

$*»824»88

TOW
ORDER OF

r
9

f-"

n
COMMERCIAL WAREHOUSE LLC
c / o ttafriaon Uuru
2t>96 id* U n i v e r s i t y A v e . , See* 290
f r o v o , UT 84604

£OJIABLE
AUTHOR£fO~$ICNATUKl

••OC00 3M.?3» » : i 2 i i 3 7 5 2 2i: fl^?!"^ 1 2T?«•«}«•
DESCRIPTION

12/3/97

T\l. Amortization

PINA UNUMITED, LLC

AMOUNT

$1,824.88

Sett Lake City, Utah 84101

PLEASE DETACH AND RETAIN THIS STATEMENT • ATTACHED CHECK IS I N PAYMENT OF ITEMS DESCRIBED ABOVE,

TabC

Fi!_rn

DONALD J. WINDER (#3519)
STEWART R. KNIGHT (#6591)
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
P.O. Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222
Attorneys for Defendant Fetter

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KEN BRAILSFORD,
Plaintiff,

:

vs.

:

WAREHOUSE COMMERCIAL, LLC;
PINA UNLIMITED, LLC; BLAINE P.
FETTER; and CHRISTIAN OESCH,

:
:

Defendants.

:
:

ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S
AMENDED COMPLAINT

Civil No. 990900465
Judge Sandra Peuler

Defendant Blaine P. Fetter ("Fetter") responds to the allegations of plaintiff s Amended
Complaint as follows.
FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief may be
granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
Fetter responds to the specifically numbered paragraphs of plaintiff s Amended

Complaint as follows:
1.

Fetter lacks knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth

of paragraph 1 and therefore denies the same.
2.

Admits.

3.

Fetter admits he was one of the members of Pina and signed a guarantee, the

terms of which speak for themselves, and denies each and every allegation inconsistent
herewith.
4.

Fetter admits Defendant Oesch was one of the members of Pina. As to the rest

of paragraph 4, Fetter admits Oesch signed a guarantee, the terms of which speak for
themselves.
5.

Admits.

6.

Admits.

7.

Fetter lacks knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth

of paragraph 7 and therefore denies the same.
8.

Fetter lacks knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth

of paragraph 8 and therefore denies the same. Fetter reserves the right to file an action against
Harrison Horn, individually, or Warehouse Commercial.
9.

Fetter admits Warehouse Commercial and Pina entered into a Lease Agreement

dated August 2, 1996. Fetter affirmatively alleges that Warehouse Commercial had not yet
been legally formed at the time of execution of the Lease Agreement. Fetter admits he signed
a guarantee, the terms of which speak for themselves and denies each and every allegation
2

inconsistent herewith.
10.

Fetter affirmatively alleges a portion of the tenant improvements may have been

made by Collins Development and Construction, Inc. ("Collins Construction"), but has no
knowledge of the nature and amount of those tenant improvements. Fetter admits Restaurant
and Store Equipment Co. ("Restaurant Equipment") provided certain tenant improvements to
the Restaurant Space. Fetter affirmatively alleges Pina has paid or is entitled to offsets from
defendant Warehouse Commercial and/or its agent Scott Collins for Pina's share of the tenant
improvements as required under the Lease Agreement and that any additional payment is the
responsibility of Warehouse Commercial. Fetter further affirmatively alleges that certain
tenant improvements made by Collins Construction were improperly installed, not in
compliance with applicable building codes, not in conformance with the Collins Construction's
own plans, not authorized by Pina, or the labor provided was performed in an unworkmanlike
manner. Fetter further affirmatively alleges Pina was required to hire its own contractors to
complete certain tenant improvements and incurred additional costs for which neither Fetter
nor Pina has received payment. Fetter denies the remainder of this paragraph. Fetter reserves
the right to file an action against Scott Collins, individually, and Land Development Group,
Inc. for claims against Scott Collins and Land Development Group, Inc.
11.

Fetter affirmatively alleges Pina has paid or is entitled to offsets from defendant

Warehouse Commercial and/or its agent Scott Collins for Pina's share of the tenant
improvements as required by the Lease Agreement. Fetter affirmatively denies the allegations
as to reasonable value for all dollar claims asserted herein. As to the remainder of paragraph
3

11, Fetter lacks knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
paragraph 11 and therefore denies the same.
12.

Fetter lacks knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth

of paragraph 12 and therefore denies the same.
13.

Fetter lacks knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth

of paragraph 13 ajid therefore denies the same.
14.

Fetter lacks knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth

of paragraph 14 and therefore denies the same. Fetter reserves the right to file an action
against Scott Collins, individually, or Land Development Group, Inc. for claims against both.
15.

Denies.

16.

Fetter lacks knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth

of paragraph 16 and therefore denies the same.
17.

Denies.

18.

Fetter lacks knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth

of paragraph 18 and therefore denies the same.
19.

Denies. Fetter reserves the right to file an action against Warehouse

Commercial, Scott Collins, Land Development Group, Inc. and Harrison Horn for claims
against said entities and individuals.
20.

Fetter incorporates by reference his responses above to paragraphs 1 through 19

of plaintiff s Amended Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
21.

Admits.
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22.

Denies.

23.

Denies.

24.

Denies.

25.

Denies.

26.

Fetter incorporates by reference his responses above to paragraphs 1 through 25

of plaintiffs Amended Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
27.

Fetter admits he signed a guarantee, the terms of which speak for themselves

and denies each and every allegation inconsistent herewith.
28.

Denies.

29.

Denies.

30.

Denies.

31.

Denies.

32.

Fetter incorporates by reference his responses above to paragraphs 1 through 31

of plaintiff s Amended Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
33.

Fetter admits Pina signed the Lease Agreement, the terms of which speak for

themselves. Fetter denies each and every allegation inconsistent herewith.
34.

Fetter admits he signed a guarantee, the terms of which speak for themselves

and denies each and every allegation inconsistent herewith.
34. [sic]

Denies.

35.

Denies.

36.

Denies.
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37.

Denies,

38.

Denies.

39.

Fetter incorporates by reference his responses above to paragraphs 1 through 38

of plaintiff s Amended Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
40.

Fetter incorporates by reference his response to paragraph 10.

41.

Denies.

41. [sic]
42.

Denies.

Denies.
THIRD DEFENSE

The claims of plaintiff are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands.
FOURTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs claims are barred by virtue of plaintiff s negligence in failing to file a timely
Declaration of Condominium on plaintiffs property.
FIFTH DEFENSE
Fetter paid for improvements which plaintiff or his assignors should have paid under
the Lease Agreement for which Fetter is entitled to an offset for damages, if any, awarded.
SIXTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs enforcement of the mechanic's liens is barred by plaintiff1 s failure to comply
with the provisions of the Utah Mechanic's Lien Act (Utah Code Ann. Chapter 38-1-1,et. al.).
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SEVENTH DEFENSE
To the extent Plaintiffs claim relates to Fetter, plaintiff is not entitled to the
compensation he seeks, due to the fact certain tenant improvements were not in compliance
with applicable building codes, not in conformance with building plans, not authorized, not
properly installed and the labor was performed in an unworkmanlike manner.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs claims fail for lack of consideration.
NINTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff has been paid for Pina's share of the tenant improvements under the Lease
Agreement.
DATED this ~Jl]^_ day of QCitr&frfl-

. 1999.

WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
\

DONALD J. WINDER
STEWART R. KNIGHT
Attorneys for Blaine P. Fetter
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on
this ^<^K day of

Qtltr&frA—

, 1999, on the following:

Attorneys for Plaintiff:
Stephen T. Hand
Robert J. Sonne
Giauque, Crockett, Bendinger & Peterson
170 South Main Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
The original was hand delivered that same day to:
Salt Lake County Clerk
Scott M. Matheson Courthouse
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

%L*

8

^-A*

